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One of the most important developments in American politics and governance is that the attorneys general of the 50
states have become major players in national policy. Once relatively obscure stepping-stone positions focused
mainly on small-bore issues, state AGs make their presence known today in area after area, be it health care,
environmental regulation, guns, immigration, or cultural issues. The lawsuits they bring against federal agencies and
the legal settlements they reach with corporations have led to stronger horizontal relationships among the AGs, and
to any given AG’s working with—or against—his or her counterparts in other states as part of multistate coalitions.
In many ways, this development should not be a surprise. As several astute observers have noted, we are now
living in an age of “executive federalism.”[1] This term, borrowed from descriptions of political practice in
parliamentary federations such as Canada and the European Union, refers to the increasing domination over the
operation of federalism by the executive branch rather than Congress. Typically, what is being described is the
operation of the contemporary administrative state through “bargaining” and “negotiation” between federal and state
officials. The proliferation of federal waivers in federal regulatory programs is among the most salient examples of
this trend. Working in the shadow of—and sometimes in direct conflict with—statutory language created by
Congress, exceptions and additions to state obligations in federal policy have now become commonplace. This, in
turn, has empowered the President and federal bureaucrats in the policy process.
But, of course, the presidency is not the entirety of executive governance in America. The states have executives as
well—in most states, multiple executives. They include AGs, most of whom are elected independently from a state’s
Governor and most of whom have the sole authority to represent their state in litigation.[2] Much like the President,
federal agencies, and Governors, state AGs have used their authority to influence policy without the input of
legislatures. The state AGs’ mode of executive federalism is through the legal process, with lawsuits, threats of
lawsuits, and out-of-court settlements as their main policymaking tool.
The emergence of executive federalism is striking, and state AGs’ rising activism is a concerning example of how it
plays out in practice. What does AG activism mean for federalism? Put most bluntly, are AGs “ruining” federalism? In
short, I believe the answer is yes.
Contours of Contemporary AG Activism
First, let’s step back and take stock of the emergence of nationalized activism by state AGs. Inklings of their new role
appeared as early as the Reagan administration, but the critical moment for these state officials as a power in
national politics was the signing of the infamous $206 billion tobacco settlement in 1998. This was executive
federalism in action, providing a new national regulatory structure governing the tobacco industry, and without any
input from the U.S. Congress.[3] Since then, the national policy goals pursued by the state AGs have burgeoned,
and to reach those goals they have used three basic strategies.
The first takes the tobacco agreement as inspiration and seeks to make policy through multistate settlements with
corporations. This policy-creating litigation uses threats of lawsuits founded on novel and untested legal theories as
a way to force corporate defendants to the bargaining table. In exchange for an AG’s not filing suit, a defendant
typically agrees to pay penalties into state-controlled funds and to adhere to new codes of conduct. These codes are
the ultimate prize. They set up new corporate requirements not existing under current law, and they occasion the
establishment of new institutions to oversee compliance. Such a process, often coming on the heels of
congressional “inaction,” has followed dozens of AG-led settlements with drug companies, gradually reshaping that
industry’s norms as to drug pricing, production, and advertising.
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The 2012 mortgage settlement between state AGs, federal agencies, and five major banks is another recent
example of use of the tobacco model. The $25 billion agreement established new mortgage-industry rules and
created new housing policies that Congress had considered but rejected.
While policy-creating litigation is a big part of what contemporary AGs do, some of their most high-profile activism
takes another form. Rather than suing corporations as a way to regulate industries in ways that federal
policymakers declined to do, the other two strategies—policy-forcing litigation and policy-blocking litigation—target
the federal government directly.
Such litigation, which first blossomed during the administration of George W. Bush, seeks court judgments that
oblige federal agencies to expand regulation. The classic (but hardly the only) example was several AGs’ efforts to
force the Bush administration’s EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. This effort, which resulted in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency (2007), set the stage for virtually the entirety of the Obama administration’s
climate program. Much like the first-mentioned strategy of suing private companies, these lawsuits aim to circumvent
congressional action (or inaction). The Massachusetts litigation, for example, was launched after Congress voted
down a cap-and-trade bill.
Policy-blocking litigation, which involves AGs turning to courts to prevent new regulations or polices from taking
effect, has been particularly prominent during the Obama administration. These efforts, some successful and others
less so, include the AG-initiated constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act, as well as to parts of the Dodd-
Frank financial reform law, climate-change rules, and President Obama’s executive orders on immigration.
AG Activism and Persistent Myths of American Federalism
To hear the AGs tell it, all three forms of litigation represent federalism in action. Former New York Governor Eliot
Spitzer, once a rising star in his party, claimed that his activism was in the service of a “new states’ rights.” Other
AGs invoke the Brandeisian rationale of federalism-as-experimentation to defend their activism. Oklahoma AG Scott
Pruitt has been among the most vocal Republican AGs, arguing that, when it comes to fighting against federal
authority, “who else but a state attorney general is in a position to respond?”[4]
The problem with these and similar justifications is that they rely on largely outmoded assumptions about how
contemporary American federalism works. These assumptions—also prevalent in the opinions written by judges and
justices today— begin with the idea that “the states” primarily serve as a counterbalance to federal power by
providing a check on centralization. The bulk of the litigation now pursued by the state AGs explodes this myth: it is
not about pushing back against federal power but supplementing and bolstering it.
Take the policy-creating litigation—the suits against companies that form a significant portion of the work of
contemporary AGs. The settlements that emerge from these suits are state-initiated yet centralized and national in
scope by their very design. The AGs self-consciously pursue injunctive relief to accomplish things that Congress has
“failed to do,” and the corporate defendants go along, knowing that it is better to have a single global settlement than
die the death of a thousand (or at least 50) cuts. Far from resisting centralized policy solutions through state
“experimentation,” then, the AGs’ activism discourages varied regulatory possibilities and instead seeks to lock all
states into a single policy option.
Additionally, the AGs’ regulatory strategies resemble a regulatory ratchet moving only in one direction: toward more
regulation. The terms of regulatory settlements only add to, and they never subtract from, whatever corporate
obligations already exist under federal law. Settlements with banks or pharmaceutical firms do not (indeed cannot)
involve clauses freeing corporation entities from the existing regulatory floor. Instead, settlement terms pile
additional regulatory requirements on top of that floor.
What is more, many of these settlements—regardless of whether the AGs are working by themselves or with federal
partners—explicitly empower oversight by federal agencies beyond what Congress granted those agencies. Take
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the regulation of pharmaceutical advertising, for example. Congress has frequently considered and rejected efforts
to grant the U.S. Food and Drug Administration authority to require government preclearance of drug
advertisements, in part because of the free speech concerns such policies raise. Yet in a series of settlements with
pharmaceutical companies, state AGs have included provisions requiring the companies to pre-clear future
advertisements with the FDA. Settlements in other areas, from finance to energy production, include similar
expansions of both state and federal oversight of corporate activities.
Policy-forcing litigation against the federal government represents an even more explicit attempt to centralize and
expand the power of the government in Washington. These efforts, including Massachusetts v. EPA, amount to calls
by some state AGs to “come and please regulate us.” They would place every state of the union, not just their own,
onto a higher floor of regulation through the mechanism of federal mandates. This is what the coalition of AGs who
intervened in court to defend the Clean Power Plan, which raises the regulatory standards that states must meet to
reduce carbon emissions, are trying to do. It is precisely because the plan uses federal sticks to enforce state
compliance, and not despite it, that the AGs supported the plan.
Unlike the policy-creating suits against companies, which are largely bipartisan, the suits brought against the federal
government pit one group of AGs against another on a partisan basis. And this brings us to the second fiction that
contemporary AG activism exposes: the notion that one can any longer speak of “the states” in a meaningful way.
Rather than “the states” sharing some coherent set of goals, federalism disputes have increasingly come to set
blocs of states in opposition to other blocs of states. Not only are lawsuits against the federal government brought
increasingly by coalitions of same-party AGs, but these suits are frequently opposed directly by AG coalitions of the
other party.
Of course, American federalism has always featured major cleavages among states with competing interests. Yet
while some of the most persistent differences among the states have been geographic or economic, today’s
cleavages, particularly when it comes to the AGs’ federalism, increasingly boil down to the Democratic Party versus
the Republican Party. These conflicts feature Red versus Blue doing battle for or against a federal policy depending
on its ideological direction. In many ways, this reflects the greater political polarization in the country generally. But it
also poses several concerns when it comes to the AGs’ impact on federalism.
AGs’ Activism and Competitive Federalism
That AG litigation is used to further partisan goals means that it may sometimes be tactically useful to challenge
federal regulation, as with several of the Republican AG-led policy-blocking efforts during the Obama administration.
These lawsuits have met with mixed success, but some have delivered effective checks to administration policy. As
long as AGs are playing a critical role in national policymaking, however, on balance their partisan and
entrepreneurial incentives make them at best unsteady allies in the cause of limited government.
Advocates of limited government frequently argue in favor of a competitive model of federalism in which states vie
with one another to attract citizens and investment, particularly through opening markets and reducing regulation. As
Michael Greve has explained, the alternative is a cartel federalism in which states collude to raise governmental
spending and regulatory authority.[5] Key to maintaining cartel federalism is preventing any given state from exiting
the arrangement, which would place pressure on remaining states to exit as well.
Preventing states from defecting from a regulatory cartel is difficult. Even methods that worked well in the past—
such as strings-attached federalism, in which federal money serves as a carrot for states’ participation in federal
policy schemes—don’t necessarily work today. Several Republican Governors and legislatures refused to accept
federal money to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, for example. Yet Republican AGs have not
similarly defected from attempts to cartelize regulation through litigation. Regardless of party, AGs continue to sign
on to regulation-expanding settlements even in this era of Red-Blue polarization.
This is because the incentives for AGs are different from those of other state actors. Governors and legislators
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belong to a larger partisan network, with all the attendant partisan expectations and incentives. So do AGs. But
Governors and legislators also must contend with other fiscal realities. They can justify a refusal of “free” federal
money by arguing that the money is not free at all. Refusing it also means evading any federal strings attached to it,
and can forestall the prospect that accepting the federal money now requires the state to spend more of its own
budget later. This provides an independent reason beyond partisan position-taking not to enter the federal scheme.
Republican AGs, by contrast, have little incentive to defect from regulation-expanding settlements. For one thing,
new regulatory requirements embodied in settlement form are not affected by state defectors. If the defendant
agrees to a settlement, it is bound to the terms whether the settlement is with 10, 25, or all 50 states. An AG
rejecting the proceeds from a settlement accomplishes little more than passing up money without gaining the
potential long-term benefits of doing so that Governors and legislators can claim. This contrasts with defecting from
(say) the Medicaid expansion, which, at least if done by a large enough number of states, can lead to instability
within the entire program.
Furthermore, the defendants themselves will be pushing for as many states as possible to join the settlement,
preferring as they do to settle all legal claims in a global agreement. Few are the AGs who have understood this
dynamic and hesitated to join multistate settlements. One thinks of Alabama’s William Pryor, with the tobacco
settlement and Oklahoma’s Scott Pruitt, with the 2012 foreclosure settlement. These rare instances make little
difference to the ultimate result. (Even Pryor signed on to the tobacco settlement in the end.)
This political economy piece is only part of the story, however. Just as importantly, AGs have achieved bipartisan
regulation-through-litigation because they have been able to frame what they are doing in ways compatible with the
partisan coalition of which they are a part.
This is particularly important when Republican AGs sign on to settlements that effectively expand regulation over the
private sector. Even as Democratic AGs emphasize settlements as getting justice for victimized consumers against
predatory corporations, Republican AGs tout them as compatible with a commitment to law-and-order principles. In
some cases, as with “Medicaid fraud” enforcement actions against pharmaceutical firms, Republican AGs have
been able to hail legal actions as recovering taxpayer money from companies that had taken advantage of a
wasteful and inattentive federal government—even as these legal actions have the effect of expanding government
oversight across an entire private industry.
It is a lot easier to reject money from the Obama administration than it is to refuse the “free” money that flows from
corporations that the AGs (though not the courts) have determined broke the law.
For these reasons, the AGs’ bipartisan regulation-through-litigation—their taking aim at private companies—is likely
to persist. Meanwhile, it is precisely because the other two forms of AG activism (policy-forcing/blocking litigation
against the feds) are partisan that one is led to doubt that they will be used to advance a principled commitment to
limited government. Democratic AGs can and will continue to pursue greater regulation, even if (actually because) it
means expanding federal power and limiting the discretion of the states. Yet because Republican AGs seek the
goals of their broader partisan coalition, as opposed to any principled commitment to competitive federalism, they
have expanded, and will continue to seek to expand, federal power in ways compatible with whatever issues are
privileged by any given Republican coalition.
We’ve seen this already in numerous cases in which Republican AGs have taken positions conflicting with the
“states’ rights” position. It was the Republican AGs who intervened in United States v. Windsor (2013) to support the
Defense of Marriage Act, despite its representing federal encroachment on the traditionally state-defined institution
of marriage. The conservative AGs of Nebraska and Oklahoma unsuccessfully sued Colorado in the Supreme
Court, seeking to prevent Colorado’s new marijuana laws from going into effect. Republican AGs called upon the
Supreme Court to invalidate states’ gun laws (in some cases, even their own state’s gun laws) in McDonald v.
Chicago (2010). In each of these cases, it was Democratic AGs claiming the “federalism” mantle.
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The point is that AGs’ commitments to checking federal power will be unstable precisely because their incentives are
to follow the goals of their broader partisan coalition, and not to vindicate any abstract principle of competitive
federalism. Governors and legislators can benefit from a commitment to competitive federalism because they must
worry about the economies of their respective states. By contrast, AGs’ main worry is advancing the “correct”
positions of their broader partisan coalition. Particularly as the Republican Party moves further away from libertarian
commitments and adopts a more protectionist, populist, Trumpian vision, there is little reason to think Republican
AGs won’t follow the GOP down this path.
AGs and Executive Federalism
The nature of AGs’ incentives makes them unsteady allies for any sustained commitment to a vision of federalism
that promotes limited government. Yet even in terms of the model of executive federalism itself, AG activism may be
problematic. Whether one approves or disapproves of the rise of executive federalism, it is at least plausible that the
negotiation and bargaining processes inherent in executive federalism can have positive effects.[6] Such negotiation
can potentially accommodate diversity by allowing for regional variation in regulatory programs and can provide a
venue for bipartisan compromise. These advantages might help temper the problematic elements of executive
federalism, such as its lack of transparency and political accountability.
On the other hand, the AGs’ particular form of executive federalism borrows its pathologies while jettisoning several
of the purported benefits. Concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability of executive federalism are
quite applicable to AG activism, particularly given the behind-closed-doors nature of the settlement-negotiation
process. Moreover, the AGs’ policy toolkit is poorly suited to achieve the purported values of negotiation and
compromise. While they share part of the executive power on the state level, AGs’ policy tools rely chiefly on judicial
power, power that is not well-suited to fostering negotiated policy outcomes.[7]
Unlike waiver programs, for example, which involve a back-and-forth between Governors and federal agencies and
can be tailored to particular jurisdictions, AG activism seeks one-size-fits-all solutions that apply everywhere. The
AG coalitions on each side of highly partisan litigation are not seeking compromise; they are seeking court
judgments that get them everything they want. Even policy-creating litigation against private companies, which does
involve negotiated out-of-court settlements, fails to reflect “bargaining” in any real sense. As noted above,
settlements discourage experimentation and, rather than providing for true negotiation between different interests,
inevitably move the needle toward more regulation.
Conclusion
I admit to concluding, perhaps frustratingly so, without offering suggestions as to what to do about this state of
affairs. Except to say this: Even if it is conceded that the AGs are ruining federalism, it is not as if they have seized
their newfound influence in national policy under cover of darkness. They have had a lot of help, largely because
federal lawmakers and the federal judiciary continue to operate under outmoded myths about American federalism.
Congressional efforts to empower AGs are consistently bipartisan, whether that means including anti-preemption
language in statutes at the behest of the National Association of Attorneys General, authorizing AGs to enforce new
federal laws, or providing federal grants for state enforcement. The leader of efforts to incentivize AG lawsuits since
the early 2000s has not been a Progressive but one of the more conservative members of the Senate, Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa).[8]
Meanwhile, the courts have thrown open the doors to state AGs even as they have been critical of expansive
standing for other plaintiffs. Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has supported AGs’ ability to maintain broad
parens patriae suits on behalf of “the health and well being—both physical and economic—of [the state’s] residents
in general.”[9] Massachusetts v. EPA announced that henceforth AGs would be granted “special solicitude” in the
Court’s standing analysis when it comes to challenging federal policy.[10] More recent cases have continued to
illustrate the courts’ extraordinary deference to AGs’ claims of standing.[11] In the 1960s, Alexander Bickel argued
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that broad state standing to challenge federal law “would make a mockery . . . of the constitutional requirement of
case or controversy, which . . . forms an essential limitation on the reach of the power of judicial review.”[12]
Yet the courts have opened the door to AGs ever wider, under the flawed assumption that bolstering state actors
invariably means bolstering “federalism.” This assumption ought to be rethought. Romanticized notions of “the
states” as a cohesive bloc fighting the federal government’s intrusion upon their priorities simply do not describe
reality in the modern era of executive federalism. This is particularly true of the AGs, who are partisan actors
operating within a federalism that privileges entrepreneurial interests seeking for ways—any ways—to achieve their
goals. The AGs, far from “protecting the interests of their states,” as they frequently claim, are doing the bidding of
partisan and interest coalitions on the Left and Right alike.
Furthermore, AGs are not well-suited to take advantage of any purported benefits of the new executive federalism—
particularly flexibility, negotiation, and compromise. Instead, the rise of AGs has, on balance, contributed to more
regulation and added to the incoherent kludgeocracy of modern American governance.[13] This is not the recipe for
limited, efficient, or transparent government.
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